Traditional searchable encryption schemes adopting the bag-of-words model occupy massive space to store the document set's index, where the dimension of the document vector is equal to the scale of the dictionary. The bag-of-words model also ignores the semantic information between keywords and documents, which could return non-relevant search results to users. The neutral-network based natural language processing method -Doc2Vec model use word's and paragraph's context information to extract documents' features. The features contain latent semantics information and can measure the similarity between documents. In this paper, we adopt the Doc2Vec model to achieve a semantic-aware multikeyword ranked search scheme. Doc2Vec model uses the distributed representation of words and documents with a modest dimensionality of vectors while trained on a dataset with a few hundred of millions of words. Documents' distributed representations are extracted as documents feature vector by Doc2Vec model and utilized as the search index. The features of the queried keywords are also extracted as the query feature vector, and the secure inner product operation is adopted to achieve privacy-preserving semantic search with the query feature vector and index. Our scheme can support dynamic update on the document set with Doc2Vec model. The experiment on a real-world dataset shows that the fixed-length feature vector can improve the time and space efficiency on the semantic-aware search.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the rapid development of cloud service, there are a large number of users uploading their private data to save the data maintenance cost. At the same time, the cloud is not completely trustworthy, private data can be attacked or hijacked. Thus, it is necessary to encrypt their data before outsourcing to the cloud. However, the encrypted data makes data utilization a hard issue, to perform efficient searches over encrypted data becomes a challenge.
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considers the presence of specific words. But the search intent of user's search mostly is the semantic meaning in the queried keywords. Therefore, the search result could be unsatisfying. Also, due to the high-dimensional and sparse feature vectors of the TF-IDF model, the search time and space performance are poor.
To achieve searches on the encrypted dataset, we usually use the vector space model to represent the documents or the keywords. The Word2Vec [29] and Doc2Vec [30] are widelyused models in Natural Language Processing. Word2Vec model uses a distributed representation to represent the word. The distributed representation can use a low-dimensional vector to represent its original highly sparse co-occurrence matrix. The Word2Vec uses the context of a word to extract its semantic information and obtains the distributed representation. That is to say, if different words have a similar context, then they are highly semantically related. The distance between words' distributed representations measures the semantic relation between words. In this way, the Word2Vec model extracts every word's latent semantics with their distributed representation. Inspired by the methods of the Word2Vec model, the Doc2Vec model uses a similar way to learn paragraph vectors. The Word2Vec model only extracts the semantic feature of each keyword while the Doc2Vec model uses a paragraph vector to represent the semantic feature of each document. Thus, Doc2Vec is more suitable for performing semantic-aware searches over encrypted documents. Doc2Vec uses unsupervised learning over the given dataset, and the model trains the semantic feature vectors to represent the documents. When performing a search over the documents, we use the trained Doc2Vec model to infer the query feature vector by the queried keywords and obtain the most relevant documents according to the relevance scores between the document vector and the query vector.
In this paper, we propose a semantic-aware multikeyword ranked search scheme over encrypted cloud data based on the Dov2Vec model, which incorporates semantic features of the users' search intention in searchable encryption. By adopting the Doc2Vec model, our scheme uses the semantic features to achieve semantic-aware search over encrypted cloud data. The data owner uses the Doc2Vec model to extract the semantic features from the documents and generated the feature document vectors. The secure inner product operation is adopted to encrypt the index and query vectors to secure index and trapdoor, respectively. Meanwhile, the relevance score between the index and query vectors can be accurately calculated by their encrypted form. Our scheme is superior to the existing searchable encryption schemes in the time cost and space usage since the dimension of the feature vectors is much smaller than the scale of the total dictionary. Also due to the infer function of the Doc2Vec model, our scheme can fully support dynamic updates. Besides, we validate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of search efficiency and space usage. Our paper's main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We first adopt the Doc2Vec model in the multikeyword ranked search scheme over encrypted cloud data and achieve semantic-aware searches. The proposed scheme uses the Doc2Vec model to extract the semantic features from the documents and keywords.
• We propose DMRSE (Doc2Vec-based Multikeyword Ranked Search Scheme) and EDMRSE (Enhanced Doc2Vec-based Multikeyword Ranked Search Scheme) to meet different security requirements. We also propose a mechanic to achieve a dynamic update on the encrypted dataset outsourced to the cloud.
• We have performed the secure analysis on our scheme, and the result shows that the DMRSE scheme is secure in the known ciphertext threat model, and EDMRSE is secure in the known background threat model. Through the experiment on the real-world dataset, our scheme is outperformed than the existing TF-IDF and Word2Vec based schemes.
II. RELATED WORK A. PRIVACY-PRESERVING KEYWORD SEARCH SCHEMES
The privacy-preserving keyword search schemes use a secure searchable index based on the document dataset, which is outsourced to the cloud server. Then the cloud server searches the searchable index with the trapdoor generated by the user, and return related documents. It is the first time that Song et al. [5] defined a problem model for searching on encrypted cloud data, who proposed a single keyword searchable encryption scheme and proved its security. Wang et al. [6] proposed a searchable single-keyword ranked search encryption scheme. Their scheme used the TF-IDF model for document representation, which is an effective model for feature extraction. Also, it used the inverted index for usable data utilization. Schemes [2] , [7] also used a keyword-based model to return ranked search results when searching a single keyword. Privacy-preserving multikeyword searches also have been proposed to obtain more related k documents than the traditional schemes. Cao et al. [8] proposed a privacy-preserving multikeyword ranked search scheme (MRSE), which used homomorphic encryption to obtain the ranked search result over the secured index. On their basis, Sun et al. [9] built a MDB-tree [31] to improve the search efficiency and proposed a secure multikeyword search scheme. Xia et al. [16] built a special index tree and used ''Greedy Depth-first Search'' to achieve sub-linear search time. Their scheme can support dynamic updates over the dataset. Chen et al. [12] and Zhu et al. [17] proposed efficient multikeyword searchable encryption schemes, which utilized a clustering algorithm to improve search efficiency.
Many schemes that support fuzzy keyword search, conjunctive keyword search and similarity search have also been presented, which can satisfy user's different search requirements. Wang et al. [20] proposed a multikeyword fuzzy search scheme by adopting local sensitive hashing and bloom filter encoding. Yu et al. [32] proposed a multikeyword similarity search scheme by adopting the keyword suppressing technique and the bloom filter and designs a user authorization mechanism based on the blind signature to ensure the user access privacy. Sun et al. [28] proposed a searchable encryption scheme that supports conjunctive keyword search, search result verification and dynamic data update simultaneously.
B. MULTIKEYWORD SEARCH SCHEMES WITH SEMANTICS EXTENSIONS
With the fast development of the NLP technique, it is possible to perform semantic analysis over text. Also, the semantic-aware search is becoming increasingly important. The semantic meaning of user search intention is hidden among the queried keywords while traditional models like the TF-IDF model cannot exploit the semantic meanings between keywords and documents. Thus, many searchable encryption schemes that support semantic search are proposed by utilizing semantic tools. Xia et al. [33] extended queried keywords with synonyms to implement semantic-aware multikeyword searchable encryption and used the inverted index. Fu et al. [34] used the MRSE scheme to implement multikeyword searchable encryption and adopted the synonym expansion on dictionary keywords, their scheme can return ranked results. They also proposed an intelligent semantic search method [35] by adopting the knowledge of concept map to process the keywords. Besides, they proposed a semantic-aware searchable encryption scheme based on concept hierarchy with private and public servers [36] . The scheme considers the domain concepts related to knowledge of documents and supports semantic searches.
The Doc2Vec is widely used for document classification domains [37] , [38] . It is an extension of Word2Vec for extracting semantic features from a document or paragraph. The main task is to infer the appropriate distributed representation for a document. The learning process can be treated as a neural network by the information of words in the same context. The Doc2Vec model is proposed by Quoc Le and Tomas Mikolov [30] . The Doc2Vec model is on the basis of their previous works [29] , [39] . In this paper, we use the Doc2Vec model to extract features from the documents dataset and achieve semantic-aware multikeyword ranked search. Thus, our scheme supports semantic search. The Doc2Vec model can also descend the dimension of the document vector, which improves search efficiency and space consumption.
III. NOTATIONS AND BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE
. . . , d n }.
•D -The encrypted document set of D. • m -The number of features, which is the dimension of the fix-sized vector generated by the Doc2Vec model.
• Q -The ranked search with multiple queried keywords, Q = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w h }.
• DV -The m-dimensional feature document vectors of D generated by Doc2Vec model, DV = {DV 1 , DV 2 , . . . , DV n }.
• I -The secure search index, which is the encrypted form of DV .
• V Q -The m-dimensional plaintext query feature vector.
•Ṽ Q -The m-dimensional trapdoor vector, which is the encrypted form of V Q .
B. WORD2VEC AND DOC2VEC
Traditional searchable encryption schemes mostly adopt the bag-of-words model to transfer every document to a document vector, which the dimension is equal to the scale of the dictionary. These models mainly have two disadvantages. First, the bag-of-words model will consume a large amount of space to store the document vectors as the scale of the dictionary is large when the dataset is huge. And the vector itself is highly sparse. Second, the bag-of-words model ignores the semantic relationship between two words that cause their inner product equals to zero. The order of words is also ignored while different order can result in different semantic meanings. To overcome the bag-of-words model's limitations, Mikolov et al. [29] proposed a new word representation model Word2Vec, as shown in Fig. 1a . Their model used a neural network to train the dataset, Word2Vec try to precisely the current word from a window of surrounding context words. Their work is done perfectly to describe the semantic relationship between words.
Doc2Vec is an extension of Word2Vec that uses a paragraph vector to represent a paragraph or a document. The paragraph vector can describe the semantic relationship among documents. As shown in Fig. 1b , Doc2Vec uses a fixed-length m-dimensional distributed vector to represent each word, where m is much smaller than the size of the dictionary. In addition, the Doc2Vec model also uses a fixed-length m-dimensional distributed vector to represent the document. That is to say, Doc2Vec uses two matrices to represent the feature of words and documents and trains neural network.
When we finish training the neural network, we can obtain the vector representation of each document. Also, with the trained Doc2Vec model, we can infer the new document to get its vector representation. In this paper, we adopt the Dov2Vec model and the feature vector to achieve the semantic-aware search.
C. OPERATION DEFINITIONS 1) RELEVANCE MEASUREMENT
In this paper, we measure the relevance score for the query and a document by the cosine distance between the corresponding vectors of them. Given two n-dimensional vectors p and q, we calculate the relevance score between p and q by:
In our scheme, we normalize the vector of documents and the query. Thus, we obtain the relevance score only by the inner product of two vectors. The relevance score is used for obtaining the most related documents.
2) SECURE INNER PRODUCT OPERATION
The secure inner product operation proposed in [8] can obtain the privacy-preserving inner product of vectors. Given two n-dimensional vectors p and q, the secure random n × n invertible matrix M for data encryption, the encrypted forms of p and q are generated byp = M T ·p andq = M −1 ·q, wherẽ p andq are the encrypted forms of p and q, respectively. Then, the inner product of original vectors can be calculated by the inner product of their encrypted formp·q, as (2) shows. Thus, the cosine distance of two vectors is obtained by the secure inner product of their normalized forms.
IV. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. RANKED SEARCH MODEL
In this paper, the ranked search model is to return the most relevant k documents from the document set 
Given a query Q, the ranked search is denoted as a triple:
where Q = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w h } is the queried keywords set and k is the number of requested documents, k n. We use Q to represent a query for simplicity.
Assuming that given a query Q, R is corresponding ranked search result, then we have:
where V Q is the query topic vector of Q while DV i and DV j are the document feature vectors of d i and d j respectively.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we adopt the same system model as [16] , [40] shown in Fig. 2 , the system consists of three entities, the data owner (DO), the data users (DU) and the cloud server (CS). They collaborate as follows:
1) DO owns a document set D = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n }, and he wants to outsource D to CS and provides the search function to DU on CS, while D should be stored in CS in its encrypted formD. DO uses the Doc2Vec model to infer D to obtain the document feature vector DV i for each document d i in D. The Doc2Vec model is trained by a large scale dataset before inferring D. Then, DO encrypts D to its encrypted formD and encrypts DV into I which uses as the search index. At last, DO outsourcesD and I to CS.
2) DU is the authorized user to perform searches on D. Assuming that DU wants to query a ranked search Q = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w h }, it uses the same trained Doc2Vec model to generate the query vector and encrypt it toṼ Q , then submits V Q to CS. After CS returns the search result, DU decrypts the encrypted documents result with the secret key shared by DO, and the query is finished.
3) CS provides data storage and query function for DO and DU. CS stores the encrypted document setD and the secure searchable index I for DO. When receiving the search trap-doorṼ Q from DU, CS conducts privacy-preserving ranked search with the index I and finally returns the k most relevant documents to DU.
C. THREAT MODEL
In the searchable encryption over cloud data, CS is normally considered as ''honest-but-curious''. Specifically, CS honestly implements its functions by following the proposed protocols. However, CS is curious about the sensitive data stored in the dataset. It will infer and analyze the encrypted dataset, index and search protocols. In this paper, we adopt this threat model as in many related works [4] , [16] , [41] . Two threat models proposed by Cao et al. [8] are adopted in our paper accordingly by the information that CS knows.
1) KNOWN CIPHERTEXT THREAT MODEL
In this model, CS knows the encrypted document setD, the encrypted document indexes I , and the trapdoorṼ Q . CS can conduct the ciphertext-only attack (COA) [42] to infer the secure key and obtain the plaintext of the secure index.
2) KNOWN BACKGROUND THREAT MODEL
In this stronger model, CS is able to acquire more background information. According to Reza Curtmola et al. [3] , CS can acquire additional trace information, which contains the length of documents, search outcomes, search pattern. With outcomes and patterns, CS can infer which documents that contain specific query keywords. In traditional TF-IDF based search schemes, CS can even obtain the term frequency distribution by the relevance score during a query request [4] , [16] . That is to say, CS can apply statistical attacks [42] to infer or even recognize certain keywords.
D. DESIGN GOALS
Given a search request Query(D, Q, k), the proposed ranked search scheme is aimed to achieve these following goals
The proposed scheme is designed that CS is able to return the most semantically relevant and ranked k documents by a query submitted by DU. Also, the scheme can support dynamic update on the document set.
2) SEARCH EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS
The proposed scheme is designed to achieve efficient and accurate search by adopting the Doc2Vec model.
3) PRIVACY-PRESERVING
The proposed scheme is designed to protect sensitive information from the curious CS. Specifically, the information in the document set, the index and the query should be preserved. The specific requirements are as follows:
• Document confidentiality: the plaintext of the documents should be secured.
• Index confidentiality and query confidentiality: the index of the document set should be secured, and the search vector generated by queried keywords should be secured.
• Trapdoor unlinkability [16] : CS should not infer that two trapdoors are generated with the same queried keywords.
• Keyword privacy: CS should not identify the specific keyword in documents, index, and trapdoors by analyzing the statistical semantic information. The keyword vector is replaced by the feature vector in our scheme. The cloud server cannot tell the difference between keyword vectors and feature vectors. Thus, the semantic (feature) privacy is also discussed in the analysis of keyword privacy.
V. SECURE SEARCH SCHEME BASED ON THE DOC2VEC MODEL
In this section, we describe the construction of the proposed scheme by adopting the Doc2Vec model and secure inner product operation. The basic framework of our search scheme consists of two modules, which are setup module and search module, as shown in Fig. 3 A. DMRSE SCHEME
We proposed DMRSE by adopting the secure inner product operation proposed in [8] and achieve semantic-aware privacy-preserving multikeyword ranked search scheme by adopting the Doc2Vec model. The detailed procedures are described as follows: SK ← GenKey(1 l(n) ). DO generates the secured key SK ={S, M 1 , M 2 , g}, where S is a randomly generated m-bit vector, where m is the scale of features in Doc2Vec model, M 1 and M 2 are randomly generated m×m-dimensional invertible matrices, and g is the key for document set encryption. SK is only shared by DU but protected from CS.
DV ← DSInfer(D). The Doc2Vec model is pre-trained by a large scale dataset, which has a large dictionary that can cover most of the dataset's vocabulary. DO use the model's neural network to infer the feature vectors of the documents in the document set. The dimension of the feature vector is much smaller than the scale of the dictionary of the document set. Assuming that the Doc2Vec uses m dimensions to represent the feature of a document, then DO get m-dimensional feature vector DV i for each document d i in D. DV is normalized and treated as the plaintext index for semantic-aware search.
(I,D) ← EncData (SK, DV, D) . DO encrypt DV and D by SK and generates the secure index I and encrypted docu-mentsD. For each document d i the procedures are given as follows. 
3) DO encrypts d i with the key g in SK to its encrypted formd i .
After processing each document in D, we obtain the encrypted document setD and the secure index I . At last, DO outsourcesD and I to CS and shares SK and Doc2Vec model with DU.Ṽ Q ← GenTrapdoor(Q, SK) . DU generates the trapdoor V Q with its queried keywords Q by performing the following steps:
1) DU inputs its queried keywords to the Doc2Vec model, the Doc2Vec model treats the keywords as a paragraph and infer its feature vector by the trained neural network. The normalized m-dimensional feature vector for Q is the plaintext query vector V Q . 2) DU uses S to spilt V Q into two vectors {V Q , V Q }by the following two rules:
Similarly, DU generates the search trapdoorṼ Q using the secure matrices M 1 and M 2 to encrypt V Q and V Q as shown in (6).
where DV i and I i are the document feature vector and its secure index, respectively.
Proof:
Theorem 1 indicates that the proposed scheme can obtain the plaintext inner product between the document feature vector and query vector by calculating the secure inner product between the trapdoor and the secure index. As the document vector and query vector are normalized previously, our scheme can calculate the cosine distance between two vectors.
RList ← SSearch(D, I ,Ṽ Q , k) . CS conducts the secure inner product operation between every document index in I and the trapdoorṼ Q to perform the semantic-aware ranked search. According to Theorem 1, we obtain the top-k most semantically related documents as the search result RList. RList satisfy the following requirements:
Finally, CS returns the RList to DU, and DU decrypts it with SK . The ranked search is finished.
B. EDMRSE SCHEME
Based on the DMRSE scheme, we proposed EDMRSE to enhance its security. In the known background model, CS can gather the result of the query and the statistical information of the documents. Because the query vectors generated by the same queried keywords have the same value, CS can link these query requests by inferring the search result's relevance score, which stays unchanged with the same trapdoor. Thus, we introduce some phantom terms on the vectors of the documents and trapdoor to obfuscate the ranked search result. However, this could decrease the search accuracy of the proposed scheme, the randomness of the phantom terms can adjust between accuracy and security.
EDMRSE scheme is mostly the same as the DMRSE scheme, the different algorithms are as follows:
SK ← GenKey(1 l(n) ). DO generates the secured key SK ={S, M 1 , M 2 , g}, where S is a randomly generated (m + p)-bit vector; M 1 and M 2 are randomly generated (m + p)× (m + p)-dimensional invertible matrices, where p is the number of the phantom terms.
(I,D) ← EncData (SK, DV, D) . Each document vector DV i is extended to be a (m + p)-dimensional vector, where the extended dimension DV i [m + j], j = 1, . . ., p, is set to a random number α j . Thus, each encrypted document vector is now a m + p dimensional vector.
V Q ← GenTrapdoor(Q, SK) .The query vector V Q generated by the queried keywords is also extended to be a (m + p) dimensional vector. However, the values of the extended dimensions in the query vector are randomly set as 1 or 0.
RList ← SSearch(D, I ,Ṽ Q , k) . With the additional phantom terms added, the relevance score between every document index in I and the trapdoorṼ Q is now changed to
. Therefore, the relevance score is obfuscating by the random value and the security is enhanced.
C. DYNAMIC UPDATE OF DMRSE
In the proposed scheme, we support dynamic insertion or deletion of a document. According to the pre-trained neural network over a large scale dataset, the newly inserted document hardly can contain new keywords out of the vocabulary. Thus, we can easily infer the newly inserted document's feature vector by the Doc2Vec model. We assume that CS uses a tag to locate the document and its secure index. The detailed algorithms are as follows: Delete(d delete ) . The document deletion only requires DO to upload the document's tag that needs to be deleted. CS finds the corresponding document and deletes the document and its secure index I delete in I . Thus, document deletion is finished. Update(d update ) . Update operation is almost the same as insert operation. DO performs DSInfer(d update ) algorithm by inputting the document d update that needs to be updated. Then DO encrypts the document feature vector to I update and outsources to CS along with the document tag and the encrypted updated document. CS finds the corresponding old document and replaces it with the updated document and index. Doc2Vec model replaces the word vector used in the TF-IDF model with the feature vector, which means the dynamic update will not affect the length of the vector and the value of the non-changed vector. Also, with the pre-trained model, the vocabulary merely needs to update. However, if there are new words appearing and DO wants to update the vocabulary, DO can use a high performance trusted third party to perform the training of Doc2Vec model. The trusted third party can also do the query vector generation to save the calculation cost of DU.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We give the security analysis on DMRSE and EDMRSE according to four privacy requirements in the designed goals.
• Document confidentiality
In DMRSE and EDMRSE, we encrypt the document set by asymmetric encryption (such as AES) with the secure key SK . The document confidentiality is protected since SK is protected from CS.
• Index confidentiality and query confidentiality The secure key SK contains two randomly generated matrices M 1 and M 2 . According to the procedures of EncData algorithm, the proposed scheme first use split vector S to randomly split a vector to two vectors and then uses M 1 and M 2 to encrypt these two vectors. Thus, the query and index are obfuscated, according to [43] , CS cannot calculate the matrices only with the ciphertext only attack. That is to say, the index confidentiality and query confidentiality are well protected from CS in DMRSE and EDMRSE.
• Query unlinkability With a query Q with its queried keywords, DMRSE generates the corresponding query vector V Q and randomly splits it into two vectors by secure key S. Thus, the trapdoor generated with the same query request will be different according to the random splitting operation. However, CS can link the same query request by analyzing the relevance scores in the result list. In EDMRSE, we add phantom terms to further obfuscate the relevance score that calculates by the same query request. The unlinkability can be adjusted by the value of α x . Thus, the query unlinkability is protected in DMRSE and enhanced in EDMRSE.
• Keyword privacy
In machine learning and pattern recognition, a feature is an individual measurable property or characteristic of a phenomenon being observed [44] . In the proposed scheme, we use one of a machine learning model, Doc2Vec, which use features to express document. The queried keywords are also being extracted as the query feature vector. Rather than the TF-IDF based model directly uses word information as the value of vectors, the keyword information is hidden in the feature vector. Each dimension of the feature vector does not have specific semantic meanings. The distance between the two vectors is utilized to measure the semantic connection between them. If the query feature vector and document vector have the same feature value distribution, this does not represent the document contains some queried keywords. Thus, the keyword privacy is protected in DMRSE and EDMRSE. Under special circumstances, CS could infer some keywords that have strong semantic meanings, the EDMRSE uses phantom terms to obfuscate the relevance score, which can also disturb the semantic relation between queried keywords and documents. Therefore, the keyword privacy is enhanced in EDMRSE.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To evaluate the performance of our scheme, we compare our scheme with the Word2Vec based scheme and TF-IDF based scheme [16] under different settings. We implement the Word2Vec model to extract the document features by the mean value of the sum of all its contained keywords' feature vectors. We implement these schemes using Python in Windows 10 by the Gensim framework [45] for training and Java for searching over the encrypted dataset with an Intel Core(TM) I5-8400 CPU. We train the Word2Vec model and Doc2Vec model by a 2010 Wikipedia dump, which contains millions of words and documents. A standard real-world dataset 20 newsgroup dataset [46] is used as the test dataset, which contains 11315 documents in total with 20 different categories. Each experiment is an average of 10 executions. We do not modify the relevance calculation in EDMRSE, thus the search accuracy and efficiency are the same as DMRSE without the phantom terms. The influence of phantom terms is discussed in [40] and EDMRSE is ignored in the experiment for simplicity. The default parameter setting is shown in Table 1 where n, m, h and k are the numbers of documents, features, queried keywords and required documents respectively.
A. SEMANTIC PRECISION EVALUATION
The 20 categories in 20 newsgroup dataset divide the documents into different classes, these categories bring with semantic meanings, such as sports, hardware, politics. We use the topics of these categories to evaluate the semantic precision of our scheme. If the queried keywords belong to the same category, the documents in different categories are considered as semantically irrelevant. For example, if the user searches ''CPU'', ''Hardware'' and ''Motherboard'', then the documents belong to hardware related categories are considered as a positive result. We select the highly related keywords manually chosen from a random category such as sports or politics in the semantic precision experiment. We use semantic precision P to describe the semantic accuracy of schemes, as shown in (9):
where TP and FP indicate the numbers of returned documents that belong or not belong to the category of the search intent, respectively.
It should be noted that the TF-IDF model only uses the term frequency of keywords to measure its relation to documents, and it does not consider the semantic meanings. Thus, the semantic precision metric we defined is not suitable for TF-IDF based scheme, and we only measure the semantic precision of Word2Vec and Doc2Vec based schemes.
1) SEMANTIC PRECISION VERSUS n
The semantic precision P we defined cannot fully demonstrate the effectiveness of our model. Thus the experiment is conducted to show the difference between the Word2Vec model and the Doc2Vec model. For example, documents in different categories can have similar semantic meanings. Fig. 5a indicates the semantic precision of DMRSE is about 20% better than that of the Word2Vec model. The average precision of DMRSE is 89.8% and 85.8%. The reason is that the Doc2Vec model takes document semantic information into consideration to extract the semantic features of the dataset, while Word2Vec only considers word's information. When performing a query over a document set, Doc2Vec can express the document more precisely. Word2Vec only adopts the sum of word vectors to represent the document. The semantic precision of these two models stays steady when the number of documents changes, this is because the model is pre-trained by a large dataset and will not be affected by the test dataset. However, we can increase the precision by training at a more suitable dataset.
2) SEMANTIC PRECISION VERSUS k Fig. 4b indicates the semantic precision of DMRSE is better than Word2Vec based scheme. The average precision of DMRSE is about 85%. The precision slightly decreases as k increases, the reason is non-relevant documents are added to the result list while the number of most related documents is limited. Fig. 4c indicates the semantic precision of DMRSE is about 95% and 85% when n = 5000 and n = 8000. And Word2Vec model's precision is significantly influenced by the queried keywords. The reason is that the Doc2Vec model can infer the semantic meaning of a sentence or a paragraph more suitable while the Word2Vec model could be influenced by the quality of queried keywords.
3) SEMANTIC PRECISION VERSUS h

B. TIME COST EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the search efficiency of the searching algorithm in TF-IDF based scheme and DMRSE. Because we use the same number of features to infer the document's feature vector in Word2Vec and Doc2Vec model, and the search algorithms are the same, we do not analyze the Word2Vec model's performance in this section. Fig. 5a indicates that the search efficiency of DMRSE is significantly better than that of TF-IDF based scheme. The average time cost of DMRSE is 99% lower than the TF-IDF based scheme as n increases. The reason is that each search scheme needs to perform secure inner product operation between documents and the trapdoor, the dictionary of the document set when n = 8000 contains tens of thousands of keywords. While the dimension of the feature vector in DMRSE is fixed-sized, which significant smaller than the scale of the dictionary. The dimension of the vector decides how many calculations need to be performed in secure inner product operation. Thus, the search efficiency is improved in our scheme. As n increases, the search time cost also increases simultaneously. However, due to the lower dimension of document vectors, DMRSE increases slightly and remarkable lower than TF-IDF based scheme.
1) TIME COST VERSUS n
2) TIME COST VERSUS k Same as Fig. 5a , the search efficiency of DMRSE is also significantly better than the efficiency of TF-IDF based scheme. The figure also shows that the time cost of DMRSE changes little while TF-IDF based scheme linearly increases. The reason is that in DMRSE, we need to sequentially traverse all the secure document index which has no relation to k. In the TF-IDF based scheme, the search time cost increases synchronously as the number of tree nodes that need to be accessed increases.
C. SPACE COST EVALUATION
In searchable encryption, CS needs to stores the additional secure index to achieve the multikeyword ranked search. In this section, we perform space usage evaluation from the perspective of secure index space usage.
The space usage of DMRSE is about 99% less than that of TF-IDF based scheme, and almost the same as Word2Vec based scheme. The reason is that we use the same dimension of vector as Word2Vec based scheme in DMRSE, which is much smaller than the dimension of the vector in the TF-IDF based scheme. Also, the TF-IDF based scheme adopts an index tree to improve the search efficiency, which also requires additional space to store the tree structure. Thus, the DMRSE can save the space usage cost on CS. Theoretically, the spatial complexity of the encrypted document vector in DMRSE and TF-IDF based scheme is O(nm) and O(nu), where u is the scale of the dictionary and u is much larger than m. Therefore, the space usage of the secure index in DMRSE is significantly smaller than the TF-IDF based scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a semantic-aware multikeyword ranked search scheme by adopting the Doc2Vec model. Doc2Vec model extracts the features from the document set and can implement semantic search by the features. Traditional schemes ignore the semantic information by adopting the bag-of-words model and cannot fully meet the user's search intention. Also, the dimension of features is much smaller than the scale of the dictionary, which improves the efficiency of our scheme. The real-world experiment shows that our model is superior in search efficiency and accuracy to the TF-IDF based model and the Word2Vec model. The security analysis proves the DMRSE and EDMRSE can achieve the security requirements in two different attack models. Besides, our scheme can support dynamic updates on the document set, which shows that our scheme can easily be deployed in a real-world application.
